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Internal auditing must b e co ntroll e d as must all functions, yet it 
must be free and suffici e ntly independent to fulfill its audit role. 
Control implies constraint, restraint, re ·strictions on freedom to 
initiate, to act. c·ontrol implies oversight by an authority higher up 
in a hierarchy. Control implies performance toward a plan and a 
subsequent appraisal of performance attained, including subjective 
j udgmen_ts of the performer. 
Independence, however, implies freedom of choice, unfettered, 
unrestricted. Independence implies action without fear of reprisal or 
of punishment. Independence implies the latitude to allocate resources 
without notice or prior approval. Independence implies the absence of 
bias or of conflict of interest. 
Debates regarding control versus independence often reduce to the 
simplistic notion that all can be solved by having for Internal Audit 
the proper reporting slot in the corporate hierarchy. It is ~roposed 
that management will overcontrol, hence Internal Audit must report to 
the Audit Committee if it is to be properly independent. Many internal 
auditors suggest that they must report to the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) if they are to enjoy the needed independence. Others have 
suggested that true independence and freedom from bias can come only if 
internal audit reports directly to the full Board of Directors. We 
shall return to this issue in a bit. 
Consideration of this executive view of control of the Internal 
Audit function is very timely because .the issues have, to some extent in 
recent months become better defined and polarized. This review will 
attempt to identify a prevailing view of control of the Internal 
Audi tor, in terms of sources and underlying causes. Within that 
framework, control will be described as it is viewed by the Audit 
Committee and the Chief.Executive Officer. 
Evolution of the Audit Committee 
Before we turn our attention to the control of Internal Audit by 
the two central parties, let's briefly review the evolution of the newer 
of the two: the Audit Committee. Their first major unveiling was 
probably their endorsement by the SEC subsequent to the McKesson & 
Robbins scandal. Not much of importance followed until the early 
l970's. Ernst & Whinney's study in 1970 revealed that only about 30% of 
the companies surve yed had Audit Committees. But their followup study 
in 1976 revealed that over 89% of the Fortune 500 had Audit Committees. 
In 1977 the New York Stock Exchange made an Audit Committee a 
prerequisite for continued listing. And the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act of 1977 has convinced most of the laggards that an Audit Committee 
is a necessary part of a system of assurance of adequate internal 
control. 
There is no longer the is sue of "whether or not" an Audit 
Committee. The issue now is what truly should be the duties of the 
committee and how it should manage its affairs. The American Bar 
Association assigns four duties to the committee: 
1. Recommend the firm to be hired as outside auditor. 
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2. Consult with that auditor regarding planning of the audit. 
3. Review with that auditor their audit report and management 
letter. 
4. Consult with the outside auditor and the internal auditor 
on the adequacy of internal controls. 
Just how a particular Committee carries out its duties is a consequence 
of the talents and experiences of the Chairman and members. As an 
example, a survey of members of Audit Committees of 49 major U.S. banks 
revealed the following responses: 
Question: Should a purpose of the Audit Committee be to provide 
attention to the internal audit function? 
Response: Highly Important - 78% 
Not Highly Important - 22% 
Question: Should a function of the Audit Committee be the 
coordination of the audit with internal auditors? 
Response: Very Important-70% 
Not Important-30% 
Question: Can the Committee be effective in coordinating the audit 
with internal auditors? 
Response: Very effective-75% 
Not Very Effective-25% 
Metamorphosis Underway 
Given such perceptions and events, one must agree that the role of 
the internal auditor is, indeed, undergoing an externally-caused 
metamorphosis. The Securities and Exchange Commission has caused 
certain events which are impacting quite directly on the internal 
auditor. The United States Congress has passed legislation which bears 
immediately and directly .on the internal auditor. Corporate boards of 
directors and chief executive officers concerned with their corporate 
accountability responsibilities are, themselves, sources of considerable 
turmoil in this area. 
Corporate bribe payments made to foreign officials in exchange for 
business opportunities has resulted in major legislation. The 
Protestant work ethic, which fundamentally prevails in the United 
States, is inconsistent with such ways of doing business; the press and 
the Congress have reacted in ways aimed at preventing those kinds of 
business dealings. The major aspect of this problem for auditors is 
that those bribes were concealed in the corporate books of account. The 
accounting · requirement for full disclosure was not met when those 
transactions w~re not correctly and fully recorded as to their true 
purpose and the true expenditure. 
In addition to change imposed from the political and social arena, 
technical changes in the' tasks of the internal auditor stem from 
computerization of accounting systems and management control systems 
with attendant dramatic differences in the kinds of internal controls 
which are amenable to 
programs in computer 
clerical processing. 
implementation. As an example, the use ·of · stored 
systems is generally a direct substitute for 
The elimination of clerical processing eliminates 
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opportunities for separation of duties, a heretofore basic concept of 
preventive control. Further, computer fraud, while admittedly not 
pervasive, has nevertheless, captured major headlines. These headlines 
have caused stockholders and other publics in the constituencies of 
firms to be more concerned than before about accountability. 
The power of the Securities and Exchange Commission to regulate 
the internal behavior of the American corporate business community has 
been radically changed as a result of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(FCPA), imposed as a result of failures to properly account and disclose 
bribes and political contributions. The Act requires all companies 
subject to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to make and keep 
books and records which accurately and fairly reflect the transactions 
of the company; it also requires those firms to devise and maintain 
systems of internal accounting controls which provide reasonable 
assurance that transactions are executed in accordance with management's 
authorization, that transactions are recorded so that financial 
statements are in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles, and that accountability and security of assets is 
maintained. The intern_al accounting controls must insure that access to 
assets is in accordance with management's authorizations and that 
records of assets are· compared with physical assets at_ reasonable 
intervals and that action is taken on all discrepancies. 
In its implementation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission has issued rules which explicitly 
make it illegal for any person to falsify company books and records. 
Other SEC rules make it illegal for any officer or director of a 
registrant to make a materially false, misleading, or incomplete 
statement to an auditor in connection with an audit of the financial 
statements. Of significance to auditors is an emphasis on materiality 
in only the second of those two requirements. The absence of 
"materiality" in the first requireme·nt probably will create a problem of 
interpretation for management. In that rule prohibiting falsifying of 
books and records, the SEC has turned to the FCPA for its language. The 
Act seeks reasonableness rather than materiality. The SEC rule seeks 
reasonableness rather than perfection. It is important to realize that 
reasonableness does not mean the same thing as materiality, since the 
FCPA' s goal of corporate accountability goes beyond a concern for 
financial statement content. Further, it is important to recognize that 
the new SEC rules are not qualified with a reference to intent. 
According to the SEC, any reference to intent would be inconsistent with 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the intent of Congress in imposing 
that Act. Of relevance to this audience is _ a recognition that these new 
rules apply to corporate directors, corporate officers and "other 
persons." These "other persons" quite clearly include the accounting 
officers of the firm and the internal auditors of the firm as well as 
the Chief Executive. 
CEO's New View of Internal Audit 
In earlier years, the CEO probably was ignorant of the specific 
tasks of internal audit. The financial officers took care of whatever 
needed to be done. 
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Not any more. Given the new corporate accountability, the 
President of the New England Merchant's Bank may . have said it be~t: 
The new definition of accountability includes going to jail. 
The fact that internal auditors may help executives stay 
out of jail may have something to do with the warmth and affection 
top management now feels for them. 
Given all of the forces for change, what do CEO's expect of Internal 
Audit? We should establish these expectations before we consider how 
CEO's wish to control actions to accomplish such expectations. 
Operational auditing to improve efficiency ranks particularly high 
with CEO's in these troublesome _economic times. As such, Interal Audit 
is an arm of management, evaluating efficiency and effectiveness of 
operations, of planning and control systems at all levels in the 
organization. 
As to internal control, CEO's want several things, according to 
that bank president: 
1. Assurance that assets are safeguarded. 
2. Confirmation that policies are followed. 
3. Confirmation of operational capabilities of production 
and service. 
4. Early warning of potential problem matters. 
5. Reduced outside audit fees. In 1977, such fees in the U.S., 
according to Financial Executive magazine, ranged from .16% of 
sales down to .02%, depending on the level of sales. For a 
$100 million company this is an audit fee of $100,000. For a 
$500 million company, the average fee was $300,000 with a 
range of $54,000 to $1,600,000. Clearly, the CEO paying the 
top of the range will want Internal Audit to carry some of the 
load. 
Audit Committee Perceptions 
Given the increasing pressure from the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the New York Stock Exchange, and other sources for the 
creation of audit committees of the boards of directors, it is 
instructive to recognize how those audit committees perceive their major 
purposes and methods of effective operations. In a recent survey of 
bank audit committees, 78% of the respondents thought it was of high 
importance that the committee provide specific attention to the internal 
audit function and of high importance that the committee devote 
attention to improving the effectiveness of the financial and operating 
controls system. 
In a question regar.ding functions of audit committees, 70% of 
these same respondents reported it very important that the audit 
committee be involved in coordination of the external audit with the 
internal auditors; 94% thought it very important that the status of 
implementation of internal c.ontrol be reviewed with and discussed with 
the Audit Committee. Finally, 93% deemed it very effective to have the 
Audit Conunittee involved in being aware of and discussing the status of 
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implementation of suggestions for improved internal control and 
reporting. 
At a recent conference, two audit committee members of Boards of 
major U.S. firms made the following comments: 
Of significant importance in our firm is the impact of the 
change in the Audit Committee's role in internal audit 
operations. Two years ago the chief internal auditor had 
a staff of only 17 auditors and reported to the corporate 
controller. Currently the staff consists of 50 professionals 
and the chief auditor's position has been elevated to that of 
vice president reporting directly to the Audit Committee. 
It is difficult to define the role of the Audit 
Committees of very large well-established companies simultaneously 
with those of smaller and relatively new companies. I am involved 
in audit committees of two companies - - one large, one small 
and what these audit committees do is really quite different 
from firm to firm. This is because the larger company is 
equipped with a magnificent set of controls and a very capable 
internal audit staff, while in the other, smaller firm the 
directors must ride herd on internal auditing. 
These directors reported that skills and qualifications of the 
internal audit staff should grow in response to an expanded scope. 
There has been a movement from a group with limited responsibility 
toward that of a highly skilled professional group of internal auditors. 
An additional participant in the conference reported, "We don't have 
juniors so to speak; most of the people on our internal audit staff have 
three to five years of public accounting experience. In addition, we 
have ex-FBI agents, lawyers, computer science specialists, and the 
like." 
There was not unanimity in support of the need to "ride herd" on 
internal auditors. One audit committee member indicated that he would 
rely exclusively on his external auditor to appraise ·and to report on 
the adequacy of internal audit. Such reliance, however, was reported to . 
have gotten at least one firm in trouble. A director reported the 
following: 
It turned out that the internal and external auditors 
were aware of the illegal payments being made by the 
firm. Management of the firm was also awa .re of illegal 
payments. None of the three groups, however, felt it necessary or 
appropriate to bring to the attention of the Board or to the 
Audit Committee this set of illegal circumstances. 
The location of internal audit within the structure of the firm and 
access of internal staff persons to the ·audit committee was discussed. 
One member of an audit committee suggested that individual internal 
audit staff members should be encouraged to come forward with issues 
even if the manager of the internal audit were not in agreement; he 
felt that if any auditor has any doubts as to the validity of co~trols 
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or correctness of stat eme nts he should voice those concerns to the 
cornmi tte e . Oth e r dir e ctors at this same conference opposed such an 
open-door policy. From the org a nizational behavior perspective, there 
are genuine co n c e rns that managers of intenal audit may not be able to 
cope with havin g staff membe rs go over their heads and thereby being 
overruled. Ther e is also the concern that the Audit Committee may begin 
to usurp managem e nt's responsibilities to the extent that they interject 
themselves in day to day problems. 
Control Of Internal Auditing - CEO View 
Since operational auditing is beyond our present interest, we will 
only consider here internal control aspects of the CEO's concerns. 
The CEO will, first of all, become personally involved. His 
commitment to and support of Internal Audit will be made clear by word 
and by deed. He will provide adequate staff, pay adequate salaries and 
facilitate communications between Internal Audit and operating managers. 
He will communicate his willingness to hear .bad news. 
He will, then, hold Internal Audit . accountable to a high level of 
professionalism. They will be expected to learn how their industry and 
their firm operates. They will be expected to acquire state-of-the-art 
knowledge and skills as technology demands. As an example, they must be 
highly proficient in the audit of computerized operational control and 
accounting systems. 
Because the CEO manages by delegation, he likely will look ~o his 
Chief Financial Officer to advise him when Internal Audit has failed to 
meet expectations and when corrective control action by the CEO is 
required. 
Control-Audit Committe e View 
Audit Committees have, themselves, undergone a metamorphosis in 
recent years. There has evolved a clear dichotomy: one group of Audit 
Committees do very little beyond holding perfunctory meetings to engage 
the outside auditors and holding form without substance sessions for 
receipt of the audit report. This group of committees is small in 
number. 
The oth e r, much larger group of Audit Committees has evolved to an 
activist, de eply involved level of work. This group represents the 
committee role anticipated by the New York Stock Exchange and by the 
SEC. This committee's involvement with Internal Audit includes the 
following: 
Review and approve the scope of and results of work by 
Internal Audit. 
Review recommendations made and rnanageMent's implementation. 
Report to the full Board on the performance of Internal Audit. 
Review the staffing, qualifications, budget of Internal Audit. 
Participate in the hiring of the Director of Internal Audit. 
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By the ve ry cr eatio n of a charter for the Audit Committee, the firm 
assures an activist Committee. Legal liability is a concern of every 
director. Audit directors are aware that courts hold directors who have 
special skills or special duties to a higher level of performance. As 
one audit dir e ctor phrased it,"If you don't do what you have set out as 
your own guidelines, I would feel quite strongly about that." 
Audit Committees recognize that there is a proper line between 
review on the one hand and usurpation of management duties on the other 
hand. They are careful not to cross this line. It has been well said 
that, 
If the committee tries to take over management's responsibilities, 
it becomes part of ma·nagement, hence, part of the problem. 
Because of the presence of an activist Audit committee, the CEO's 
controls may become . more demanding. The CEO will more likely require 
better internal controls, knowing that he will look bad if the Audit 
Cammi ttee reports weaknesses. He may adopt controls • which are less 
clearly cost/benefit justified, knowing that the committee will likely 
e.rr on the side of improved controls. The CEO will assure the 
implementation of more recommendations, knowing that the Committee will 
carefully and critically question reasons for failing to ·adopt. 
Finally, the Audit Committee will be much less tolerant of mediocrity in 
Internal Audit .than will the CEO unless stimulated by the Committee. 
Full, unfettered access to Internal Audit is required by the Audit 
Committee. Open communication is vital. By sharp, probing questions in 
its meetings with Internal Audit, the Committee shows it expects the 
highest quality of professional performance. The Committee receives 
copies of all internal audit reports and should meet regularly, alone, 
with the Director. It will ask such questions as: 
How do you judge which areas need special attention? 
How much do those being audited know what you are going to audit? 
How do you plan to maintain your level of audit skills? What 
personnel changes do you _anticipate? What reasons are there for 
turnover in the past year? 
What do you plan with regard to auditing officers' expense 
accounts? Personal service invoices? Consultants' services? 
"Reporting To" - A Non-Issue 
Too much has been made over the issue of to whom Internal Audit 
should report. Authors have become fond of quoting Henri Fayol who 
wrote, "Men cannot bear dual command." They would cite fears of loss of 
independence if Internal Audit were to be managed by a corporate 
executive. They would then conclude that only a reporting relationship 
with the Audit Committee would permit Internal Audit to succeed. 
In rebuttal, authors would write that such an arrangement wo~ld 
strike at the very center of management authority. No such reporting 
could be tolerated. At the extreme, Internal Audit might report to the 
CEO, but the only practical solution would be to give this duty to the 
Chief Financial Officer. After all,if the Director of Internal audit 
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wer e to be fired, the Audit Cammi ttee would automatically be alerted 
that something was amiss. 
The former Cha"irman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Harold Williams, urged an organizational framework that would let 
Internal Auditors do their job by being administratively responsible to 
top management and generally overseen by the Audit Committee. To the 
question, "To whom should Internal Audi tors report?" Mr. Williams 
suggested two definitions of the word "report." Internal Auditors 
should report, in the sense of being administratively accountable, to 
some member of top management who is knowledgeable of the profession of 
auditing. Internal Auditors should report, in the sense of 
communicating with and discussing their finding and recommendations, to 
the Audit Committee. 
Harvey Kapnick, of Arthur Andersen, has a parallel recommendation 
with regard to the reporting relationship of Internal Audit. Mr. 
Kapnick suggests that the chief executive officer of the corporation 
must be personally involved in updating the Internal Audit function. He 
suggests that the internal audit manager report organizationally to the 
chief executive officer. Internal Audit would then be perceived by the 
board,by the Audit Committee and by management as being truly as 
independent as is possible of the activities within the organization 
which are being reviewed. If it is argued that the chief executive 
officer is not. qualified to supervise the Internal Audit function, such 
is no less true of the CEO' s supervision of finance and accounting 
matters, marketing, production, legal or other areas of the firm's 
operations in which the chief executive does not have a depth of 
personal experience. Kapnick goes on to suggest that the Audit 
Committee monitor the activities of Internal Audit rather than directly 
supervise them, with a wide-open line of communication for the flow .of 
information sufficient to the needs of the Audit Committee and to the 
needs of the Internal Auditor. 
Summary 
A minority of firms today view control of the Internal Auditor in 
an unchanged manner. In these firms, the internal audit function is 
buried deep within the financial organization~ the head of internal 
auditing reports to the corporate controller or indeed in some cases 
below the level of the corporate controller. The role of the Internal 
Auditor is viewed as merely one of assuring compliance with internal 
accounting policies and procedures and little . more than that. 
However, that is assuredly a minority view of the profession. The 
responsibility of the Internal Auditor in the majority of firms in 
recent years has been dramatically broadened. ·The scope of internal 
auditing is being broadened to include EDP auditing, the evaluation of 
controls throughout the o~ganization, the evaluation of data prepared by 
senior management, and special investigations on an as-needed basis. 
The reporting level· of the internal auditing manager within the 
organization structure has been elevated. 
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The trends are r e al; they are likely to ~e irreversible. Demands 
for e nhancea·c o rpora te accountability can only accelerate current trends 
in this directi o n. 
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